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INTRODUCTION

When we began developing this topic last winter and early spring, the global
pandemic in which we still find ourselves deeply entrenched, a year later, was
just emerging. For many in the United States, including our former President, the
threat seemed distant, even hypothetical.1 Few imagined the devastating loss of
life, health, economic security, home, family, companionship, and “normal”
ways of life that we would come to experience over the next year.
As we near the one-year anniversary of the first lockdown orders in the United
States, three broad themes emerge from the COVID-19 landscape that inform the
topic of this symposium on The Future of Global Health Governance. First, comparison of the public health infrastructure in the United States to other developed
countries. Second, comparison of the social safety nets and other measures that
the United States took to alleviate the effects of the virus to the rest of the world.
Finally, the impacts of partisan polarization and distrust of government and science on pandemic response and management.

II.

PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE

As of this writing, the United States is ranked fourth in the world in rate of
vaccinations per capita against the COVID-19 pandemic.2 U.S. healthcare continues, rather stubbornly, to hew a private-market approach to health care delivery, albeit with a heavy hand of government regulation to attempt to correct market imperfections and address some of the most inhumane effects of allocating
scare health care resources based on ability to pay rather than greatest need. The
lack of universal healthcare in the United States could be one of the contributing
reasons why its vaccination rates is not among the upper echelons of countries
like the United Kingdom, Israel, or the United Arab Emirates.3

1
See Thomas Franck, Trump Says the Coronavirus is the Democrats’ ‘New Hoax’,
CNBC (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/28/trump-says-the-coronavirus-isthe-democrats-new-hoax.html (“‘The Democrats are politicizing the coronavirus,’ he said
from a campaign rally in North Charleston, South Carolina . . . . ‘This is their new hoax.’”).
2
See More than 199 Million Shots Given: Covid-19 Tracker, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2021,
8:12 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-vaccine-tracker-global-distribution/.
3
Annabelle Timsit, Three Countries Have Pulled Far Ahead of the Rest of the World in
Distributing Covid-19 Vaccines, QUARTZ (Jan. 11, 2021), https://qz.com/1953007/the-countries-with-the-most-effective-covid-19-vaccine-rollouts/.
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One of the advantages of a universal healthcare system is that centralization
of information makes it easier to match supply and demand of the vaccine, remediating some of the initial logistical hurdles with vaccine distribution.4 Additionally, countries with national health services already have public health infrastructures in place to vaccinate their populations because of pre-existing, robust,
government-operated vaccination programs. By contrast, the United States has
to start from the ground up in building its vaccination clinics and developing the
legal infrastructure necessary for administering vaccinations.5 This lack of coordinated government distribution led to testing “mills,” scams for money and personal information, and a Wild West of vaccine distribution as individuals deemed
eligible for the vaccination (eligibility itself a moving target), chased rumors and
social media postings from grocery store pharmacies, to local health departments, to newly designated distribution centers, like a treasure hunt for gold.6
Even if the United States’ vaccine rollout is comparable to or better than other
advanced countries with a universal healthcare system, its lack of an equivalent
system hindered response to COVID-19.7 Effective COVID-19 responses include prompt diagnoses and quick quarantining of infected individuals to halt the
spread of the virus, but both of these measures are hindered by the disincentives
associated with visiting a physician.8 For one, the potential for facing ruinous
medical debt as a result of the United States’ lack of universal healthcare is inhibiting our most effective COVID-19 responses (besides getting the vaccine) as
underinsured are less likely to seek out diagnoses.9 This is further underscored
by U.S. health insurance being bound up with employment—as unemployment
rates steadily creep up as a result of the pandemic and the measures taken against

4

Id.
Elizabeth Cohen, US Lags Behind Some Other Countries in Covid-19 Vaccinations,
CNN HEALTH (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/30/health/us-uk-israel-covidvaccinations/index.html (“Tuesday, [Dr. Celine Grounder] told CNN’s Jim Sciutto that health
care in the US is ‘very decentralized, very fragmented,’ compared to the National Health Service in the UK, ‘where they have really one system that they can roll this out smoothly to. We
have many, many different small systems in this country.’”).
6
Joseph Goldstein, Hospital Workers Start to ‘Turn Against Each Other’ to Get Vaccine,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/24/nyregion/nyc-hospitalworkers-covid-19-vaccine.html?fbclid=IwAR0N9ncqtK7SFKDfJ5VUTDs0tuxmUjwiYNX_3PcLDjShNpWHRXKEftYfW3A (“Health care workers said rumors were proliferating in WhatsApp groups and amid the banter of the operating room. Stories have begun to
circulate of a plastic surgeon who managed to get vaccinated early, of doses being thrown out
at one Manhattan hospital because of poor planning. On group chats, doctors debate how—
and whether—to try to get vaccinated ahead of schedule.”).
7
Alison P. Galvani et al., The Imperative for Universal Healthcare to Curtail the
COVID-19 Outbreak in the USA, 23 ECLINICALMEDICINE 1 (2020).
8
Id.
9
Id.
5
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it (such as lockdowns), the less likely an American is to seek help for COVIDrelated symptoms due to their loss of insurance.10
The lack of a national healthcare system also highlights the racial and economic disparities prevalent in the United States and may help explain why
COVID-19 is disproportionately impacting African-American communities.
Rates of adequate health insurance coverage are lower among people of color
meaning they have less access to preventative healthcare.11 Because of their lack
of access to preventative care, people of color are more likely to suffer from
comorbidities, thereby exacerbating the severity of clinical outcomes when they
do contract COVID-19.12

III.

THE UNITED STATES SOCIAL SAFETY NETS AND COMPARATIVE
RESPONSES GLOBALLY TO HEALTH AND WELFARE

Leading public health scholar, Lawrence Gostin has observed: “As a society,
we forego the possibility of bold public health governance by any given branch
in exchange for constitutional checks and balances that prevent overreaching and
assure political accountability.”13 Indeed, not only horizontal checks on power,
across the three branches of government, but also vertical checks, as among federal, state, and local authorities, also challenge the United States’ response.
These structural obstacles have been revealed sharply in the COVID-19 pandemic.
A. How U.S. Federalism Impacts COVID-19 Response
Characteristic of U.S. Health Care Law is a “turf war” between federal and
state/local authority to regulate health care markets and provide public assistance
for those deemed eligible. Much of the story of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 has been a power struggle between “big” federal takeover of health care and assertions of states’ rights to do things differently within
their borders. In public health, in particular, state and local governments hold
broad and well-developed authority to compel vaccination, quarantine, isolation,

10

Id.
Id.
12
Id.
13
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 82 (3rd ed. 2016).
11
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social distancing, masking, and other critical interventions to control the spread
of infectious disease.14 The federal government’s authority is more limited.15
There are three reasons why this aspect of U.S. federalism makes responding
to the COVID-19 pandemic and the related economic crisis challenging. First,
the inability of states to engage in deficit spending forces them to rely on Congress to make up for any budget shortfalls as a result of reduced tax revenue.16
Second, the federal government’s heavy reliance on discretionary fiscal policy
measures as opposed to automatic stabilizers makes it difficult to respond timely
and proportionately to crises due to the decentralization of information inherent
in our federalist structure of government.17 Finally, the automatic stabilizers that
do exist, such as unemployment insurance, are less efficient because the hybrid
federal/state nature of the programs result in varying requirements and administrative obstacles to those searching for aid.18
In the United States, individual states generally are not capable of engaging in
counter-cyclical spending because of constitutional, balanced budget requirements and statutory spending limits.19 States’ lack of ability to engage in deficit
spending after the Great Recession hampered recovery because states began cutting spending in order to meet balanced budget requirements.20 Since Congress
does not face the same budget requirements or statutory spending limits, states
14

Mark A. Hall et al., The Legal Authority for States’ Stay-at-Home Orders, NEW
ENGLAND J. MED. (July 30, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2019662
(“States have always had broad emergency powers, and legislatures have carefully reevaluated
these laws over the past 20 years after terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and epidemics, ensuring that civil liberties protections are included. Though these statutes are being tested in
new ways, they have proved durable enough to protect against abuses of power . . . .”).
15
The federal government can take additional actions to supplement state and local responses that are inadequate in order to prevent the spread of international and interstate diseases, but this power is not often exercised. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Presidential Powers
and
Response
to
COVID-19,
JAMA
NETWORK
(Mar.
18,
2020),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2763423.
16
Phillip Rocco et al., Stuck in Neutral? Federalism, Policy Instruments, and CounterCyclical Responses to COVID-19 in the United States, 39 POL’Y & SOC’Y 458, 460 (2020).
17
Id. at 461.
18
Id. at 466 (“Yet while automatic stabilizers do exist in the United States, their effectiveness hinges on how fiscal and administrative responsibilities are divided between the federal
and state governments, the capacity of state governments to administer these programs under
crisis conditions, and the ability of both state and federal agencies to cooperate to offer relief
from administrative burdens that depress the uptake of benefits.”).
19
Glenn Follette & Byron Lutz, Fiscal Policy in the United States: Automatic Stabilizers,
Discretionary Fiscal Policy Actions, and the Economy 1–19 (Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Working Paper,
Paper No. 2010-43, 2010) (asserting that federal policy actions in response to an economic
crisis tend to be somewhat counter-cyclical; however, state responses appear to be somewhat
pro-cyclical possibly because of the constitutional restrictions on budget balances).
20
See Ben S. Bernanke, Ben Bernanke: I Was Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Save the
States., N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/opinion/benbernanke-coronavirus-federal-aid.html.
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have to rely on the federal government to provide them with additional resources
in order to fund policies designed to counter the effects of an economic crisis or,
more pointedly to this symposium topic, a pandemic.21 Therefore, Congress’s
failure to agree on passing fiscal measures responsive to the crisis can result in
states being forced to cut spending, which response could not only hurt recovery
but also lead to unintended consequences down the line.22 To provide another
example from the Great Recession, the failure to pass spending measures resulted
in states cutting budgets of local and state public health departments, arguably
leaving us in weaker positions to respond to the current pandemic than we would
have been in before the recession.23
Moreover, Congress’s overreliance on discretionary fiscal programs as opposed to automatic fiscal stabilizers accentuates the challenge of dealing with the
COVID-19 economic crisis.24 When a government actively makes a change to
the level of taxing or spending in which it engages, it is enacting a discretionary
fiscal policy.25 On the other hand, automatic stabilizers are fiscal policies in
which a change occurs without futher legislative action when some threshold
requirement is realized. An example of an automatic stabilizer is an increase in
unemployment insurance payouts triggered by a certain percentage national unemployment rate.26
Another challenges is that discretionary policies require information in order
to be effective, but there is a great amount of informational uncertainty due to
the highly decentralized nature of our federalist government.27 Furthermore, due
to the lack of a formal venue for intergovernmental negotiation for state and local
officials, governments and other private interest groups end up competing with
21

Rocco, supra note 16, at 458.
William A. Galston, Using Automatic Stabilization Programs to Fight Recessions and
Speed Recoveries, BROOKINGS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/usingautomatic-stabilization-programs-to-fight-recessions-and-speed-recoveries/.
23
Id.
24
Rocco, supra note 16, at 461.
25
Expansionary and Contractionary Fiscal Policy, LUMEN, https://courses.lumenlearning.com/wm-macroeconomics/chapter/expansionary-and-contractionary-fiscal-policy/ (last
visited Jan. 28, 2020).
26
Id.
27
Rocco, supra note 16, at 461 (“Where discretionary programs are concerned, federalism
accentuates the challenge of coherent, comprehensive decision-making in the midst of a crisis
. . . the decentralized and uncertain character of fiscal information makes it difficult for Congress to match policy to the scale of the crisis.”). For example, Congress had to pass the
CARES Act without information from the Bureau of Economic Analysis who reported on the
extent of employment loss in the last week of April. The CARES Act was passed nearly a
whole month before the Bureau’s report and the particulars of the relief bill were deliberated
upon even before that. States had access to this information earlier but its decentralization
from members of Congress made it difficult for them to get to the information quickly and
pass policies that were proportionate to the extent of the economic harm being caused by the
virus. See id.
22
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one another for relief during economic crises.28 In addition, failures by Congress
to pass additional discretionary fiscal policies to help states fund counter-cyclical
programs is certainly problematic.29 It took Congress until the end of December
of 2020 to agree to additional funding for states to assist with vaccination efforts.30 State and local health departments, in the meantime, were not able to
prepare for the vaccine rollout plans by hiring the necessary staff or setting up
vaccination centers despite requesting more funding for months, thereby, contributing to delays in the vaccine rollout in the United States.31
Economists argue that U.S. economic recovery policies would benefit from
increasing the amount of automatic stabilizers due to their quicker response times
compared to discretionary policies.32 Even the automatic stabilizer programs that
do exist in the United States have some aspect that is discretionary.33 Additional
unemployment insurance benefits, for example, typically are not extended without some form of discretionary policy decision.34 Furthermore, administrative
hurdles due to federal and state eligibility rules screen out individuals who could
be in dire need of assistance. Finally, significant variations in administrative infrastructure that support automatic stabilizers across states may result in significant wait times for relief.35

28

Id. at 472–73.
William A. Galston, Using Automatic Stabilization Programs to Fight Recessions and
Speed Recoveries, BROOKINGS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/usingautomatic-stabilization-programs-to-fight-recessions-and-speed-recoveries/ (“Federal transfers to states and localities provide efficient and effective fiscal stimulus. But during the Great
Recession, the national effort fell short. While states were still struggling, the 2009 stimulus
bill expired in 2012 and nothing was done to replace it. Instead, concern about rising federal
deficits and debt triggered restraints on discretionary spending that shifted federal policy toward austerity while unemployment remained elevated. This exacerbated the slowdown at the
state and local level.”).
30
Jake Horton, Covid-19: Was U.S. Vaccine Rollout a ‘Dismal Failure’ Under Trump?,
BBC (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55721437 (last updated Jan.
26, 2021).
31
Id.
32
Heather Boushey et al., Recession Ready: Fiscal Policies to Stabilize the American
Economy, BROOKINGS (May 16, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/recession-ready-fiscal-policies-to-stabilize-the-american-economy/ (“Using evidence-based automatic ‘triggers’ to alter the course of spending would be a more-effective way to deliver
stimulus to the economy than waiting for policymakers to act.”).
33
Rocco, supra note 16, at 461.
34
Id. at 467 (“Finally, Tier 3 is constituted by emergency benefit extensions that Congress
routinely passes during recessions.”).
35
Id. at 473.
29
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B. What Has the United States Done Compared to Other Countries?
Federally, the United States has offered support to those affected by the pandemic through two large pieces of legislation—namely, the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES Act) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act—as well as smaller pieces of legislation such as the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, the Families First
Coronavirus Response Act, and the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and
Health Care Enhancement Act. The CARES Act provided two weeks of paid sick
leave if an employee is sick with COVID-19 or is quarantining following orders
from the authorities.36 Furthermore, the Act provided support to parents with
children under age eighteen whose school or childcare facilities are closed.37 The
government provided support up to a limit of $200 per day, capped at a total of
$12,000.38 Additionally, the federal government extended resources through
SNAP to provide food to households with low income.39 Unemployment insurance payments were increased by $600 per week, as well as direct payments of
$1200 for each adult and $500 for each child of all U.S. residents with gross
incomes up to $75,000.40 $500 billion in financial assistance in the form of loans
were given to large companies and governments.41 $380 billion in economic support was given to small businesses as part of the PPP.42 The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 was signed into law on December 27, 2020.43 Along
with the omnibus spending bill for the 2021 federal fiscal year, a $900 billion

36
Families First Coronavirus Response Act: Employee Paid Leave Rights, U.S. DEP’T
LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/pandemic/ffcra-employee-paid-leave (last visited
Oct. 19, 2020).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
USDA Increases Monthly SNAP Benefits by 40%, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Apr. 22,
2020), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2020/04/22/usda-increases-monthly-snapbenefits-40.
40
Danielle Kurtzleben, What’s In It For You? $1,200 Checks, 13 Weeks Of Unemployment Payments And More, NPR (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/25/8215
14231/whats-in-it-for-you-1-200-checks-13-weeks-of-unemployment-payments-and-more.
41
Here’s Everything the Federal Government Has Done to Respond to the Coronavirus
so Far, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND., https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2021/01/heres-everythingcongress-has-done-to-respond-to-the-coronavirus-so-far (last updated Jan. 25, 2021).
42
John Fuller et al., Senate Approves $380 Billion Expansion of CARES Act Small Business Loan Programs, JDSUPRA (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/senateapproves-380-billion-expansion-16029/.
43
Key Provisions of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 for Businesses and Individuals, JDSUPRA (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/key-provisions-of-theconsolidated-2031866/.
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stimulus package was included in the bill.44 The package included $302 billion
in additional funding through the PPP for small businesses, $164 billion in funding for direct $600 payments to individuals, $119 billion for increased unemployment benefits, $82 billion in aid for schools, $78 billion in health-specific
measures, and $123 billion for other measures like increased SNAP assistance,
childcare assistance, and rental assistance.45
As part of the Trump administration’s efforts to help Americans, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration was given $110 million
in emergency grant funding to “strengthen access to treatments for substance use
disorders and serious mental illnesses.”46 This funding is important given that
the COVID-19 pandemic foreseeably might cause an increase in deaths of despair, such as deaths from alcohol, drug misuse, and suicides, as well as an increase in domestic abuse incidents.47 For example, states reported increases in
domestic abuse incidents ranging from 21% to 35% as a result of isolation caused
by social distancing guidelines, economic stressors, and increases in negative
coping mechanisms such as reliance on alcohol or other drugs.48
States around the country have been taking measures to halt evictions, freeze
mortgage payments, freeze utility shut offs, and grant grace periods for rental
payments.49 Inconsistencies among states in passing policies such as mask mandates or halting evictions further reflect how federalism and the lack of a uniform
federal policy or guidelines have hurt the U.S. response to the pandemic.50 Paul
Nolette, a chair of the political science department, argues that this “can
44
Ferran Arimon & Mark Heimendinger, The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021:
Round 2 of the Paycheck Protection Program, JDSUPRA (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-consolidated-appropriations-act-38378/.
45
Here’s Everything the Federal Government Has Done to Respond to the Coronavirus
so Far, supra note 41.
46
SAMHSA Moves Quickly to Begin Releasing $110 Million in Emergency Grant Funding
to Provide Americans with Substance Use Treatment and Mental Health Services During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/04/20/samhsa-moves-quickly-begin-releasing-110million-emergency-grant-funding-provide-americans.html.
47
The COVID Pandemic Could Lead to 75,000 Additional Deaths from Alcohol and Drug
Misuse and Suicide, WELL BEING TRUST, https://wellbeingtrust.org/areas-of-focus/policy-andadvocacy/reports/projected-deaths-of-despair-during-covid-19/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
48
Kim Usher et al., Family Violence and COVID‐19: Increased Vulnerability and Reduced Reduced Options for Support, 29 INT’L J. MENTAL NURSING 549, 549–50 (2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7264607/pdf/INM-9999-na.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2021).
49
Raifman J., Nocka K., Jones D., Bor J., Lipson S., Jay J., and Chan P. (2020). “COVID19 US state policy database.” Available at: www.tinyurl.com/statepolicies.
50
Gretchen Morgenson et al., The CDC Banned Evictions for Those Affected by Covid.
Why are Tenants Being Thrown Out on the Street?, NBC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/cdc-banned-evictions-those-affected-covid-whyare-tenants-being-n1251439.
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introduce unfairness, for sure, because if you’re a renter in New York versus a
renter in Alabama, then shouldn’t you have the same basic rights?”51 Recently,
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) passed a temporary
halt in residential evictions to apply to any state that did not have the same or
greater level of protection in the order.52 Despite the order, tenants were still
being evicted.53 Courts have been inconsistent when enforcing the moratorium,
amply revealing the patchwork of policies that result from the United States’
federalist structure.54 The moratorium was set to end on December 31, 2020, but
was recently extended to January 31, 2021.55
The United States has been taking measures to help Americans being affected
by the pandemic, but there are still other policy measures that could be learned
from other countries. Other countries are giving cash transfers like the United
States’ one-time $1,200 direct payment, but for longer duration. Canada, for example, had a cash transfer approach of $2,000 per month for four months.56 Spain
developed a unique moratorium on rent payments for those in a vulnerable population for a period of time depending on the type of landlord.57 For instance,
“there is a compulsory automatic moratorium on rent payments for vulnerable
households for four months, with rental payments due over a three-year period,
or a reduction of rent by 50% for four months” for tenants with more sophisticated landlords such as companies or owners of ten or more properties.58
Many countries are offering more generous pandemic employment insurance
than the United States.59 Some governments are subsidizing or completely paying for employees that have to take leave for COVID-related reasons, including

51

Id.
Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID–19, 85 FED. REG. 173 (2020),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09-04/pdf/2020-19654.pdf.
53
Morgenson, supra note 50.
54
Id.
55
Mary K. Cunningham & Abby Boshart, Extending the CDC Eviction Moratorium
Would Keep Families Housed and Prevent the Spread of COVID-19, URBAN WIRE (Dec. 11,
2020), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/extending-cdc-eviction-moratorium-would-keepfamilies-housed-and-prevent-spread-covid-19.
56
Ugo Gentilini et al., Social Protection and Jobs Responses to COVID-19: A Real-Time
Review of Country Measures, WORLDBANK 1, 108 (2020), http://documents1.world
bank.org/curated/en/590531592231143435/pdf/Social-Protection-and-Jobs-Responses-toCOVID-19-A-Real-Time-Review-of-Country-Measures-June-12-2020.pdf.
57
COVID-19-Employment-and-Social-Policy-Responses, OFF. ECON. DEV. (July 24,
2020), http://www.oecd.org/social/Covid-19-Employment-and-Social-Policy-Responses-byCountry.xlsx.
58
Id.; Policy Responses to the COVID-19 Crisis, OFF. ECON. DEV.,
https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/country-policy-tracker (follow “Employment and Social”
hyperlink) (last updated Jul. 24, 2020).
59
Id.
52
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having to take care of someone sick.60 Another approach by some governments
is giving stipends to those recovering from COVID-19. Sweden provides a temporary parental allowance compensating around 90% of a worker’s salary to
cover the cost of a school or child care facility closure.61 Germany has modified
the work week but allowed employees to retain 60% of their salary to reduce
labor costs for companies and still maintain the labor force.62 Many of these
measures that are providing benefits to the unemployed are being subsidized by
the government or are completely paid for by the government.63 The Slovak Republic has prohibited employers from terminating employees who cannot work
because of COVID-19 isolation or are tasked with caring for an individual with
a COVID-19 diagnosis.64
Other measures taken by governments to address challenges caused by the
pandemic include healthcare-related spending. Saudi Arabia has shouldered the
burden of coronavirus treatment and testing services by making them free.65
South Korea is planning on subsidizing health insurance premiums for low-income households.66 France has helped the homeless avoid COVID-19 by requisitioning hotel rooms to provide them with temporary housing.67 Countries like
Russia, Peru, Paraguay, and Nepal are delivering food to their most vulnerable
populations.68 Grenada and Guatemala are providing food vouchers, medicine to
fight COVID-19, and delivery of care packages of basic food items to affected
vulnerable persons and households.69
The United States’ fiscal policy response is as—or more—generous than the
responses of other countries.70 Even so, given the previously discussed overreliance on discretionary fiscal policy measures, the United States will struggle if it
does not pass additional stimulus packages.71 Most European and other developed countries have stronger automatic stabilizer programs than the United
60

Id.
Id.
62
Kurzarbeit: Germany’s Short-Time Work Benefit, INT’L MONETARY FUND: IMF NEWS
(June 15, 2020), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/06/11/na061120-kurzarbeit-germanys-short-time-work-benefit.
63
COVID-19-Employment-and-Social-Policy-Responses, supra note 57.
64
Id.
65
Gentilini, supra note 56, at 387.
66
Id. at 416.
67
COVID-19-Employment-and-Social-Policy-Responses, supra note 57.
68
Gentilini, supra note 56, at 317, 348, 351, 368.
69
Id. at 200, 203.
70
See Fred Imbert, How the U.S. Economic Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic Stacks
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States, which allows them to respond quickly without separately navigating the
challenges of legislative consensus on relief packages.72 In short, relief comes in
the form of expanding already well-established systems rather than enacting
novel responses to the pandemic.73 In addition, measures that other countries are
taking, although they may seem less generous when looking at the absolute value
of total dollars spent, might be more effective because they are tailored towards
more permanent solutions. For example, policies that maintain the employer-employee relationship may have longer-lasting impact than the United States’ more
impermanent approach of one-time stimulus payments or temporary increases to
unemployment insurance.74

IV.

VACCINATION POLICY, VACCINE REFUSAL, AND GENERAL
COMPLIANCE WITH GOVERNMENT ORDERS

Secretary-General of the United Nations António Guterres passionately argued that “[t]he best response [to the pandemic] is one that responds proportionately to immediate threats while protecting human rights and the rule of law”
when confronted with the possibility that governments may use the pandemic as
a pretense to adopt unrelated measures to strip individual rights.75 Countries must
strike a careful balance between public health and individual rights to justify intrusions upon liberties that are inherently associated with measures designed to
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47% of the shock is absorbed in the EU, compared to 34% in the US.”).
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Stephen Snyder, How the US Coronavirus Stimulus Package Compares to Those of
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mitigate the pandemic.76 Even still, deprivations of individual rights are not met
without challenges.77
As we see in the United States, public perceptions of COVID-19 and general
compliance with government mandates often align with partisan and political
ideologies.78 This leads to an individual obeying whatever rhetoric fits best with
her own political leaning rather than listening to experts or science on the virus.79
Studies suggest that Republicans are less likely to comply with social distancing
guidelines than their Democratic counterparts, signifying the practical consequences of partisan polarization of virus response in the United States.80 In addition to partisan polarization, another explanator of noncompliance with government measures is the lack of social policies that would help ensure compliance.81
In other words, people would be more willing to comply with lockdown orders
for longer durations if there were existing safety nets, such as additional unemployment insurance during this period, that would help them get through the order.82
As noted above, the United States has declined universal health care and continues to allow the private market to drive health care delivery for all but certain
select segments of the population. Those deemed deserving of government assistance due to age, retirement, poverty, pregnancy, dependency, veteran status,
or a few other conditions may receive assistance through government health care
programs. But even within U.S. public programs it is not accurate to suggest that
76
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a significant risk to the public; (3) coercive measures should be proportionate to the threat
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the government acts as a fiduciary, motivated solely by the best medical interest
of its citizens. The U.S. modern administrative state was politicized in stark terms
during the past year, with scientific evidence elided or ignored, agency leadership dismissed for exercising independent judgment rather than upholding the
party line.83 The lack of trust in the government risked the effectiveness of the
COVID-19 vaccine rollout, with citizens questioning the validity of the scientific
process by which these new products were brought to market.84 The phrase
“modern administrative state” is not a neutral one but rather is used often in conservative U.S. political circles to refer to “big government” and usurpation of
power under the federal executive branch, away from more directly politically
accountable legislative representatives and state authorities. At a time where the
spread of misinformation is arguably at its greatest due to the internet, it becomes
even more evident how the challenge of general government mistrust is affecting
an individual’s confidence in complying with government orders, and most disturbingly, refusing to take the vaccine.85

V.

CONCLUSION

Each of these themes has become even more critically important to examine,
drawing lessons from the past and prescriptions for the future. This time last year,
the pandemic was ravaging other parts of the world but had made minimal impact
on U.S. shores. Now, it has become abundantly clear, both here and abroad, that
the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel lies in the hopes that enough of the
population takes the vaccine to develop herd immunity to the virus. The United
83
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States can take notes from other countries on how a universal healthcare system
can make the vaccine rollout more effective and ameliorate the suffering caused
by the pandemic itself and the United States’ halting responses to the pandemic.
Overreliance on discretionary fiscal policy measures creates a challenging environment for states when mixed with a federalist structure of government. Moreover, public health interventions that call for collective action and compromise
individual rights are challenging for a country like the United States, which constitutionally enshrines values of individual liberty, freedom, and autonomy. That
effort becomes all the more challenging due to widespread distrust in government
and the spread of false information associated with attempts to address a public
health concern. The hope is that the COVID-19 challenges faced in the United
States provide lessons for the future, including a more robust public health infrastructure; more sustained, widespread social safety nets; better coordination
among various branches and levels of government; and appropriate reliance on
scientific knowledge rather than purely partisan influences driving health policymaking.

